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Kahn:

EXCLUSION FROM INCOME OF COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES AND
POOLING OF LABOR OCCURRING IN A NONCOMMERCIAL SETTING
by
Douglas A. Kahn*

ABSTRACT
Compensation for services, regardless of the form, constitutes income to the recipient.
Consequently, the exchange of services by two individuals is treated as income to each.
However, there are numerous examples of an exchange of services that the IRS has never sought
to tax. The most common example is an exchange of services by a married couple who divide the
household chores between them. The focus of this article is to propose a principled reason for
not taxing those exchanges and to explore the limits of that exclusion. The author contends that
the income tax operates exclusively on commercial transactions, and so income derived from a
noncommercial activity is not taxable. The article explores what types of activities can be
classified as noncommercial for this purpose.
As a corollary to the proposed noncommercial rule, the article contends that the income tax does
not apply to individuals who pool their labor to obtain a common goal. The resulting exchange
of services are not taxable. The article considers the question of how broadly a common goal can
be defined for this purpose. The article examines several specific activities in which services are
exchanged and which should not be taxable. Specifically, among others the article examines:
baby sitting barter clubs, cooperative nursery schools, and home schooling.

*

Paul G. Kauper Professor of Law, University of Michigan. The author thanks Professors
James Hines and Jeffrey Kahn for their extremely helpful comments and criticisms.
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When cash is received for services, it typically will constitute gross income to the
recipient.1 But what if the payments are made in a noncommercial setting such as the payment by
a parent to a child for mowing the lawn or performing household chores? As discussed later in
this article, there are reasons to conclude that such payments do not constitute income. The
problem of how to treat receipts from a noncommercial activity frequently arises in the context of
an exchange of services. A similar problem arises when services are provided by several persons
pursuant to a pooling of labor to accomplish a common noncommercial goal.
The regulations state that if a taxpayer receives services from another as payment for
services rendered by the taxpayer, each party will have gross income for the value of the services
received from the other.2 If services were received as full or partial payment for property, the
value of the services received would be included in the amount realized on the sale of the
property. The tax problems that arise in connection with the receipt of services mostly occur
when services are exchanged, and this article addresses that situation and will deal only
incidentally with a payment of cash or other property for services.
I. Implied Agreement to Exchange Services.
A fundamental issue in determining whether the receipt of services from another has
income tax consequences is whether the services received were given as compensation for
services performed (or to be performed) by the taxpayer. If, instead, the received services were

1

§ 61. Unless indicated otherwise, all citations to a § number are to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 as currently amended.
2

Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1).
2
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given gratuitously, there would be no income tax consequence.3
When there is an explicit agreement that one service will be exchanged for another, then
it is clear that they were undertaken pursuant to a bargained for exchange. There are, however,
many situations in which there is a factual question whether services were exchanged or whether
there were mutual gifts of services. Consider the following illustrations.
Helen, an attorney, is told that she needs to undergo surgery. She employs Ralph to
perform the surgery. Ralph tells her that he is in need of an attorney to represent him in a divorce
proceeding. He proposes that he perform the surgery in exchange for Helen’s representing him in
the divorce. Helen agrees, and neither party bills the other for the services performed. Clearly,
that constitutes an exchange of services in which each party has gross income equal to the value
of services received.
Now, let us change the facts. Helen and Ralph have been good friends since childhood.
When Helen visited Ralph, he had no reason to believe that his marriage will end in a divorce;
and so he had no reason to anticipate that he will need Helen’s services. After performing the
surgery, Ralph tells Helen that he will not bill her for his services because they have been such
good friends for so long. If nothing else occurred, the services that Helen received would be
gratuitous, and there would be no tax consequence. Two years later, Ralph asked Helen to
represent him in a divorce. After doing so, Helen wanted to charge Ralph for her services, but

3

Section 102 of the Internal Revenue Code excludes from income property received as a
gift. There is no statutory provision excluding the gift of services. There is no reason to treat the
receipt of a gift of services differently from a gift of property, and it has never been subjected to
taxation. This is part of the common law of taxation. Indeed, the gratuitous performance of
services for another is not even subject to gift taxation. See Rev. Rul. 66-167, 1966-1 Cum Bull.
20.
3
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felt constrained not to charge him because of having accepted the gift of Ralph’s services two
years earlier.
In the view of the author, Helen’s provision of legal services to Ralph was not made out
of “detached and disinterested generosity”4 The transfer was not motivated by love, affection, or
sympathy. The value of her services should therefore be income to Ralph.
Does Helen’s nondonative purpose in not charging Ralph for her services convert
Ralph’s “gift” to her into being one side of an exchange so that her receipt of Ralph’s services is
income to her? That would require Helen to file an amended return. Can the character of a
transfer be changed retroactively? Ralph’s intention to provide his medical services gratuitously
is determined as of the time of his donation and is not affected by Helen’s actions, but the
subsequent event does put the matter into a different light. In the view of the author, Ralph’s gift
to Helen should not lose its donative character and so should not be taxed to her.
So, we are left with the strange result that Ralph is taxed on the receipt of Helen’s
services, but Helen is not taxed. In effect, one side of the transaction is treated as a taxable
4

See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960) establishing that as the standard
for determining a gift. That standard is not applied literally since very few transfers are totally
devoid of any selfish purpose even if it is no more than to enjoy the gratitude of the donee. In
Goodwin v. United States, 67 F.3d 149, 152, fn.3 (8th Cir. 1995), the court said;
Many courts nevertheless give talismanic weight to a phrase used more casually in
the Duberstein opinion – that a transfer to be a gift must be the product of
“detached and disinterested generosity.” To decide close cases using this phrase
requires careful analysis of what detached and disinterested generosity means in
different contexts. Thus, the phrase is more sound bite than talisman.
There is a substantial question as to whether the moral constraint that prevented Helen from
charging Ralph precludes gift treatment, but the author believes that it does. Her transfer was not
motivated by affection or a concern for Ralph.
4
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exchange, and the other side is treated as an independent transfer that is not part of the exchange!
When each of two parties receives services from the other but there is no explicit
agreement to exchange services, a question can arise as to whether there was an unstated
understanding that services would be provided by each party to the other. Should all or some of
those services be treated as compensation for the other? For example, George and Pat room
together and divide the household chores. George cooks their meals, and Pat cleans the dishes.
George does the laundry, and Pat cleans the house etc. In those circumstances, even if the parties
did not explicitly divide the chores, it would be reasonable to conclude that there was an implict
understanding that the chores would be divided so that one can be seen as done in exchange for
the other. As we will see, even if the arrangement is treated as an exchange of services, there will
be no income tax consequence.
II. Noncommercial Zone of Activity.
Although there is no explicit authority on the subject, it is a reasonable conclusion from a
study of the field of taxation that the income tax operates only on commercial transactions.5 That
is, the income tax applies only to transactions in which the taxpayer has, either voluntarily or
involuntarily, entered into a commercial transaction. Income derived from noncommercial
activities has not been taxed, and yet the principle for excluding such income has never been
articulated. It is the contention of the author that the principle underlying the exclusion of such
income is that the income tax applies only to commercial activities and that income produced
5

There is a 1917 decision of the Supreme Court in which there is a mild suggestion that
taxation does not apply to noncommercial transactions. In holding that alimony was not taxable
to the recipient, the Supreme Court stated that “Alimony does not arise from any business
transaction, but from the relation of marriage.” Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917), quoting
from Audobon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575, 577 (1901).
5
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from noncommercial activities is not taxable.
At first glance, it might appear that there is one instance in which noncommercial income
is taxed, but upon closer examination, it is clear that that provision is not an exception to the
principle proposed above. Alimony is taxed to the recipient, but alimony is not derived from a
commercial venture. The taxation of alimony serves a specific purpose that has nought to do with
the measurement of income.
Prior to 1942, alimony was not included in a recipient’s gross income.6 After the
outbreak of World War II, tax rates were increased significantly, which made it more difficult
for a payor of alimony to meet his obligations with after-tax dollars. To provide relief, Congress
decided to allow a divorced couple to split some of their income between them so that they
could take advantage of the lower tax rates that one of them had. The splitting of income was
accomplished by making the receipt of alimony taxable to the recipient and by allowing a tax
deduction to the payor for the amount of alimony paid.7 The effect of these income and deduction
provisions is to shift the incidence of the tax on the amount paid to the payee spouse to the payee
and thereby to utilize the payee’s marginal tax bracket.
If X owns jewelry as personally used property, the sale of that jewelry would be a
commercial transaction, and so would be the receipt of insurance for a theft of the jewelry.
While the jewelry was not held for commercial purposes, its purchase and sale (or involuntary
conversion to cash) were commercial transactions. X had to engage in a commercial market to
purchase or sell the jewelry or to collect a reimbursement for its loss. In addition, the use of

6

7

Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917). See also, Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935).
§§ 71(a), 215(a).
6
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property or services to purchase consumption for the taxpayer constitutes a commercial activity.
What then can constitute a noncommercial transaction? It is a transaction that, although causing
economic consequences, operates in a personal, noncommercial setting. Stating it differently,
there are noncommercial zones of activity, and economic benefits derived form those activities
are not subjected to the income tax.
It is a difficult question as to just where to draw the line separating commercial from
noncommercial activities. There are activities that are clearly commercial and those that are
clearly noncommercial. But, as is true for many distinctions that need to be made, there are grey
areas the characterization of which will turn upon the judgment of the decision maker. Over time,
precedents will establish how specific items in that grey area are to be characterized.
The clearest examples of benefits received in a noncommercial zone of activity involve a
married couple. Typically, there will not be an explicit agreement allocating tasks to each spouse,
but there will be an implicit understanding that each spouse will do his or her share. The author
knows of one marriage in which the allocation of tasks was explicit. The couple undertook to
determine the weight to be accorded to each task and carefully allotted them so that neither
spouse obtained an advantage over the other. Even in that unusual situation, there would be no
income tax consequence. There never has been an effort to tax a married couple for an exchange
of services of that nature.
Why is that so when there is so clearly an exchange of services? One consideration is that
taxing an exchange of services performed in a marital community would pose huge
administrative difficulties, and avoidance of that administrative burden is likely one factor in the
decision not to impose a tax. In addition to difficult valuation issues, it would not be easy to
7
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discover the events where one spouse performed a service for the other; and many of the services
performed will be of a highly personal nature.
But administrative inconvenience is not the only reason for excluding those services from
taxation. A tax program that would require the discovery of services performed within the marital
community would constitute an invasion of privacy and an intrusion into an individual’s private
noncommercial life, and that would be unacceptable in a free society. Even when identification
and valuation of a marital service does not pose a problem, the service nevertheless will be
excluded from income. The personal private life of individuals should not be subjected to
disclosure by the government unless there is a compelling public reason to require it. Stating it
differently, the primary reason for the exclusion is that the household tasks performed in a
marital community are in a noncommercial zone and are excluded from the income tax because
those activities are insulated from governmental oversight.
Another way of viewing the conduct of the spouses is to treat them as engaged in a kind
of joint venture in which there is a division of labor. The exchange of services by Pat and George
in the illustration above where they room together similarly would not be income to either. Part
III of this article discusses whether a pooling of services to accomplish a common goal should be
excluded from income tax conseqences.
This view of a noncommercial zone does not mean that a married couple can never
engage in a commercial venture together. For example, if a wife owns a shoe store and hires her
husband to be a salesman, they would be engaged in a commercial activity, and the wages paid to
the husband would be income to him. Taxation of that transaction does not involve a violation of
privacy nor an intrusion into an individual’s private noncommercial affairs.
8
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Not taxing services performed in a family setting is analogous to not taxing imputed
income from the services one performs for himself. An individual is not taxed on the wealth
produced by cooking his own meal, shaving himself, mowing his own lawn, building a bookcase
for his own use etc. The reasons for not taxing such imputed income are the same as those that
apply to the decision not to tax events occurring in a noncommercial zone. A tax on such
imputed income would pose difficult valuation and identification problems and would constitute
an invasion of privacy and an intrusion into an individual’s private life. Moreover, it would be
undesirable to have the tax law deter an individual from using his own labor to improve his
household, himself, or his family. If such imputed income were taxable, an individual might
choose not to shave or have his wife cut his hair or to make household improvements and repairs.
That is not to say that a person would necessarily refrain from such actions, but the imposition of
a tax liability would be a factor to be weighed in determining whether the net benefit to be
gained is worth the effort. While there is no statutory provision excluding imputed income from
taxation, it is excluded under the common law of taxation.
For some limited purposes (but certainly not for all purposes) members of a family are
treated as a single unit.8 So services performed for the family by an individual member can be
seen as services performed by the family unit for its own benefit and therefore excluded from tax
as imputed income.
Another area where the noncommercial zone concept should apply arises when a child of

8

For example, for some purposes, stock owned by one person is treated as also owned by
certain other members of the owner’s family. E.g., §§ 267(c)(2), (4), 318(a)(1), 544(a)(2). For
certain purposes, a group of related persons are aggregated and treated as a single person. §
355(d)(7)(A), (e)(4)(C)(i).
9
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the family is paid cash for doing chores. For example, Robert Jones pays his twelve-year old
son, Willie, $20 a week to mow the lawn. Should that payment be income to Willie? While the
issue does not seem to have arisen, perhaps because the child does not earn enough to require
filing a tax return, the author concludes that the $20 payment is not income to Willie. Consider
these alternative circumstances.
Robert pays Willie $20 a week as an allowance, and Willie performs chores as his share
of household responsibilities. The weekly payment to Willie is a gift and is not included in his
income.9 The exchange of services that Willie received from his parents for the services he
performed is not income under the noncommercial zone concept described above. So, Willie has
no income.
Instead, Robert wishes to instill work habits in Willie for earning his living later in life.
So, rather than give Willie an allowance, Robert agrees to pay Willie $20 a week for the chores
that Willie performs. It is the author’s view that the characterization of the payment does not alter
its noncommercial attribute. In effect, Willie receives an allowance and is required to do
household chores; the characterization of the payment as wages does not represent its actual
function.
While a number of courts have adopted a doctrine that makes it difficult for a taxpayer to
repudiate the form in which a transaction was cast, 10 that doctrine should not apply to this
situation. This is not a case where the taxpayer could manipulate the tax consequence by

9

§ 102.

10

See e.g., Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967) (en banc).See also,
Douglas Kahn and Jeffrey Kahn, Federal Income Tax (6th ed. 2011) at pp. 817-818.
10
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adhering to the form of the transaction if that proves desirable, but point out the different
substance of the transaction if that characterization subsequently proves to be more desirable. In
the instant case, there is no tax advantage to treating the payment as a wage, and the parent’s
purpose in so characterizing it has no tax motivation.
A similar situation has arisen in connection with welfare benefits, and the Service has
excluded the payments from income in that circumstance. Amounts received as distributions
from a general welfare fund (typically a distribution made by a state or federal agency pursuant to
a statute to provide help for needy persons for the promotion of the general welfare) are excluded
from the recipient’s gross income.11 To further its goals, some welfare agencies require a
recipient to perform services as a condition of receiving benefits. The purpose of that
requirement may be to inculcate work habits that will encourage the recipient to find gainful
employment. An additional purpose can be to provide training for the recipient to learn a trade.
The payments may be based on an hourly wage for work performed. As a policy matter, the
payments should not be income to the recipient if the agency’s purpose was to rehabilitate the
recipient as contrasted to obtaining the benefit of his services. In such a case, the payments
should be treated the same as welfare payments in which no work is required. The Service ruled
in Rev. Rul 71-42512 and Notice 99-313 that such payments are not income to the recipient if the
following conditions are satisfied.

11

See Rev. Rul. 73-87, 1973-1 Cum. Bull. 39; Rev. Rul. 63-136, 1963-2 Cum. Bull 19;
Rev. Rul. 57-102, 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 26; PLR 9351017 (1993).
12

1971-2 Cum. Bull. 39.

13

1999-1 Cum. Bull. 271.
11
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The recipient’s participation in the work program must be arranged and financed by a
public agency that provides welfare benefits. The total amount of payments received by the
worker must not exceed the sum of welfare benefits the worker would have received if he were
unable to work plus out of pocket expenses incurred in performing the work. In other words, the
number of hours worked must not exceed the number of hours needed to provide the worker with
subsistence for his needs.
As previously noted, the Internal Revenue Code expressly excludes gifts from income.14
A principled policy justification for that exclusion is described in a previous co-authored article
of the author’s.15 If gifts are deemed to be made within a noncommerical zone, that would be an
additional policy justification for their exclusion from income. It is a close question whether a
donative transfer lies outside of the commercial sphere. On the one hand, the donative transfer of
property bears some similarity to a sale of that property. On the other hand, a donative transfer is
noncommercial in that the donor obtains no financial benefit or consumption from the
transaction. On balance, a donative transfer appears more like a noncommercial transaction, and
so that is an additional policy justification for its exclusion from income.
III. Joint Activity Differentiated from a Barter Transaction.
While an income tax system is not comfortably applied to a bartered transaction, it is
necessary to do so to prevent wholesale tax avoidance. Consequently, as a general rule,
exchanges of property or services will be subjected to taxation.

14

§ 102.

15

Douglas Kahn and Jeffrey Kahn, “Gifts, Gafts, and Gefts” – The Income Tax
Definition and Treatment of Private and Charitable “Gifts” and A Principled Policy
Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts from Income, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 441 (2003).
12
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Barter clubs have been formed pursuant to which one member provides goods or services
to another member in exchange for credits or points that can be used to pay for services or
property received from another member.16 The value of the credits or points received constitute
income to the recipient.17 If, instead of using points or credits, services are received directly
from the other member of the club in exchange for service performed, the value of the services
received is income to each party.18 If the barter club has at least 100 transactions in a calendar
year, it is required to file Forms 1099-B with the Service to report the transactions.19
If there is an exchange of services in which the service received is an expense of
conducting the recipient’s business, and if the value of the service received equals $600 or more,
the recipient must file Forms 1096 and 1099 to report the transaction.20
Notwithstanding the tax law’s treatment of barter transactions, when an exchange takes
place in a noncommercial setting, there is good reason to conclude that it is not subject to the
income tax. However, as noted above, while the characterization of an activity as commercial or
noncommercial often is clear, there are grey areas where it is difficult to make that determination.
Over time, many of those grey areas will become clear as precedents will be established
classifying them.

16

See Rev. Rul. 80-52, 1980-1 Cum. Bull. 100; and Korpi v. United States, 53 AFTR2d
84-1048 (D. Mass. 1984).
17

Id.

18

Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 Cum. Bull. 60.

19

Rev. Rul. 83-163, 1983-2 Cum. Bull. 26.

20

Rev. Rul. 85-101, 1985-2 Cum. Bull. 301.
13

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2011

13

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 38 [2011]

A. Joint Activity.
Several persons can join together to pool their labor to accomplish a common goal. Their
joint efforts should not be treated as an exchange of services but rather as a jointly conducted
activity. When the common goal has no business connection, the exclusion of joint activity
services from income can be seen as a corollary to the proposed principle that income arising out
of a noncommercial activity is not taxable.
The application of this proposed “pooled labor” principle requires that there be a standard
for determining what constitutes a “common goal.” How broadly can such a goal be? If the
common goal is defined broadly enough, virtually every exchange of services could be classified
as serving it and thereby excluded from income. Unless limits are imposed on the concept of a
common goal, no exchange would be taxable; and that would create a large loophole in the tax
system. For example, if X repaired Y’s car in exchange for Y’s performing surgery on X’s leg,
could both services be classified as furthering the common goal of “fixing things”? The answer
is that “fixing things” is too broad a concept to be used in this context. The definition of a
“common goal” must be restricted if it is to be a useful concept for this purpose.
The common goal must be the product of a single activity that is regarded as such by the
public. The services involved must be so related that they are commonly regarded as in
furtherance of that activity. The limitation on the breadth of a common goal rests on a common
sense approach as to whether the public would consider that goal to be the purpose of conducting
an activity as contrasted to stretching the concept to incorporate the services in question. The
limitation of the concept rests on a factual issue as to what is commonly regarded as a single
activity.
14
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There is nothing unusual about having a tax law characterization rest on a factual
determination of the common understanding of a concept. There are numerous examples of that
approach. Several are listed below.
The determination of whether an item of clothing qualifies as a uniform the cost of which
can be deducted or amortized depends upon whether the item is adaptable for general use so that
it could be used in place of regular clothing.21 The test for whether an item is so adaptable for
general use turns on community standards.22
The question of whether the expenses of seeking new employment are deductible
depends upon whether the new employment is in the same trade or business as the taxpayer’s old
job.23 The deductibility depends upon a factual determination as to what constitutes a new trade
or business. As is true of the common goal concept, the trade or business standard should not be
defined too broadly. For example, a taxpayer’s trade or business could be said to be that of being
an employee without regard to the type of work performed. Obviously, the concept is not applied
that broadly.
The determination of whether a taxpayer’s educational expenses qualify as a business
expense can rest on whether the education qualifies the taxpayer for a new trade or business. As
to what qualifies as a new trade or business, the Tax Court has said that it compares the types of
tasks and activities involved and essentially applies a common sense test as to whether the new

21

Rev. Rul. 70-474, 1970-2 Cum. Bull. 34.

22

Pevsner v. Commissioner, 628 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1980).

23

Rev. Rul. 75-120, 1975-1 Cum. Bull. 55.
15
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position is different from the old.24
As a matter of societal policy, the tax law should not operate to deter the formation of
cooperative ventures in which people pool their labor for a common personal goal. The tax law
expressly provides for such pooling of labor and property for business purposes in its rules for
dealing with partnerships.25 The partners exchange of services does not cause them to recognize
income.26 The same treatment should be accorded to the pooling of labor in a joint activity that is
not connected with a business. Consider the following illustration.
John and Robert live in different parts of Manhattan. Both of them wish to have a
vegetable garden but have no land in Manhattan to use for that purpose. They each purchase land
in Long Island, and the two plots are within a few blocks of each other. Each individual plants
vegetables on his plot. Rather than having each of them travel to Long Island four times a week
to tend to his garden, they agree to take turns so that each will travel to Long Island only twice a
week and will tend both gardens on each trip.
In the author’s view, John and Robert should not be taxed on an exchange of services.
Instead, they should be treated as pooling their labor to accomplish a common goal – namely, the
maintaining of their vegetable gardens.The arrangement should be treated as combining the two

24

Glen v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 270, 275 (1974).

25

Subchapter K of Chapter 1 of Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

26

While partners are treated as mutual agents, that does not entirely distinguish their
situation from those engaged in a noncommercial joint activity. For example, Architect and
Builder form a partnership to purchase land and construct a ten-unit apartment building. The two
partners contribute an equal amount of cash. Architect designs the building, and Builder
constructs it. The mutual agency concept does not distinguish their exchange of services from the
pooling of labor by those engaged in a noncommercial common activity.
16
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gardens into a single activity. There should be no income tax consequence.
The exchange of services by the roommates, George and Pat, in an example set forth
earlier in this article also should be excluded from income as a joint activity.
B. Non-Marital Exchange of Services Not Connected with a Trade or Business.
Let us consider the treatment of a direct exchange of services that are not connected with
either party’s trade or business. One question is whether the tax consequences will depend upon
whether the parties are jointly engaged in a single activity. Consider the following two examples.
Paul is a shoe salesman who is handy at making repairs and improvements to his house
and household goods. Paul’s neighbor, Frank, is a college professor who has no talent for making
repairs. Frank is an amateur chess player who has a master’s ranking.
A window in Frank’s house is broken by a storm. Paul offers to repair it and does so. If
nothing more occurred, Paul’s provision of a service would be a gift, and there would be no tax
consequence. Instead, when Frank accepted Paul’s offer, Frank offered to give chess lessons to
Paul’s daughter, Megan, to compensate Paul for his work. Frank does give chess lessons to
Megan. Should Paul and Frank be taxable on the exchange of services?
Neither service that was provided was connected with the business or profession of the
service provider; nor was the service received connected with the business or profession of the
recipient. Nevertheless, the exchange of services can be seen as occurring in a commercial zone.
Frank could have charged for giving chess lessons, and the amount received would have been
income to him even though he is not a professional chess player. By offering to provide chess
lessons as payment for the service that Paul performed, Frank has placed his service into the
commercial market. The same is true for Paul. Under any reasonable construction, there is no
17
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common goal for the two services, and so they cannot be characterized as a pooling of services
for a common goal.
Given the isolated aspect of this exchange (i.e., it was not part of a pattern of exchanging
services), the administrative costs of taxing it are such that the government might be better
advised to ignore it. Nevertheless, a proper application of the tax law would tax the exchange.
The exchanged services were not provided to achieve a common goal. It just may not be worth
the government’s effort to enforce the tax. If one or both of the parties engage in a number of
such exchanges, then the government should enforce the tax. In that regard, note the requirement
that a barter club whose transactions in a calendar year exceed ninety-nine must file information
forms with the Service.27
Consider a second example. Mildred and Allen have a three-year old son. Their neighbor,
Susan and Peter, have two children ages two and five. On short notice, Susan and Peter need a
baby sitter and ask for either Mildred or Allen to sit for their two children. In return, they offer to
sit for Mildred and Allen’s son when needed. Both baby sitting services take place. Should each
be taxed on the service received? Should it matter if both families agree to exchange baby sitting
services on a regular basis and do so?
While it is a close question, the author believes that that exchange of services comes
within the joint activity exception described above in connection with the tending of the
vegetable gardens. The parents are tending children instead of vegetables, but the same principle
applies. There is a difference in that the baby sitting activity deals with the other family’s
children as contrasted to caring for all the children together. That difference should not matter. If
27

See supra, n. 19.
18

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/art38

18

Kahn:

instead of going to the other’s home to sit, the child or children were brought to the home of the
sitter, the sitter would be caring for all the children at the same time. The tax result should not
rest on that distinction. The goal of the arrangement is to provide for the care of all of the two
families’ children, and that constitutes a single activity.
C. Barter Club for Child Care.
A barter club can be a commercial enterprise from which a proprietor derives a profit.
There also are cooperative barter clubs in which the members themselves operate it. One such
type that is fairly common is a baby sitting club.
A child care barter club can operate very much the same way as other barter clubs do. The
baby sitting is performed by the members who are parents of young children. Points are allotted
for each hour that a member sits for another child. Additional points may be granted for sitting
after midnight and on holidays. A member’s points are reduced when he uses the baby sitting
services of another member. One member serves as a secretary who maintains a record of the
points earned and used by the members. One possibility is that, as with other barter club
programs, a member could be taxed on the receipt of points or on the receipt of baby sitting
services. How should this arrangement be treated?
A significant difference of the child care barter club from other barter clubs is that the
services that are obtained through the club are all of the same type and serve the same function.
The only service obtained is baby sitting for a young child. In other types of clubs, a member
might choose to get legal services from another member or he could choose to obtain an entirely
different type of service. Consequently, in contrast to other barter clubs, a child care barter club
can be seen to be a cooperative joint venture to engage in a single activity – that is, the tending
19
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to young children. Although conducted on a larger scale, the circumstances of the club are
similar to those in the situation described above of the two Manhattan residents who shared the
burden of tending to the vegetable gardens in Long Island. In the author’s view, the members of
the club should not be taxed.
D. A Cooperative Nursery School.
Cooperatives can take many forms. One element that they often have in common is that
they utilize a pooling of labor by members of the venture.
Cooperative nursery schools are a popular program. A group of parents form a nursery
school and hire a professional teacher. Parents who place a child in the school have an option
either to pay X dollars or to assist the teacher for a set number of hours in which case they will
pay X minus Y dollars. When assisting a teacher, the parent will serve all of the students in the
class.
The reduced cost to the parent could be seen as an implicit payment for the parent’s
services. Alternatively, and more realistically, the parent’s supplying of services can be seen as
eliminating a cost of conducting the school that otherwise would have been necessary. The
reduced cost to the parent is a form of imputed income from providing services for his own
benefit (and the benefit of his own child), and imputed income is not taxable.
However, by tending to all of the children in the class, each participating parent
effectively exchanges his services for the services his child receives from other participating
parents. The situation is similar to the example above of the two Manhattan residents who take
turns tending their gardens in Long Island. As stated in discussing that situation, the author
concludes that the cooperative nursery does not constitute a taxable exchange of services but
20

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/art38

20

Kahn:

rather is a pooling of labor to accomplish a common goal.
E. Home Schooling.
Some parents choose not to send their children to public or independent schools. Instead,
their children are taught at home by their parents. In many cases, the children of several families
are combined into a single class and taught by several parents. The parents divide the subjects
among them so that each parent teaches different subjects.28 Are the teaching services performed
by one parent compensated by the teaching service performed by the other parents? Given the
approach adopted in this article, there is no exchange of services and so no income tax
consequence. The parents pool their services to achieve the common goal of educating their
children. The activity of educating children is one that is commonly conducted and so there is
no difficulty in finding that the common goal requirement is satisfied.
Would the result be different if the exchange of teaching services were limited to two
subjects? Consider this example.
John would like his child to learn French, but it is not taught in the local school. Robin
would like her child to learn Latin, but it is not taught in the local school. John agrees to teach
Robin’s child Latin in exchange for Robin’s teaching John’s child French. Is that a pooling of
services for a common goal? The common goal could be to teach a foreign language or more
broadly to educate the children. In the author’s view, neither goal is too broad to serve for this
purpose; and so the exchange is not rtaxable..
The situation is distinguishable from home schooling in that it does not involve all of the
children’s education, but is limited to a single subject for each child. A common activity is
28

Some families also hire a professional to teach a specific area such as science or Latin.
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tutoring of children, and the instant situation fits that category. In any event, the type of services
performed by both parties are sufficiently similar that they should be regarded as furthering the
same goal. The instant situation is comparable to the exchange of gardening services by John
and Robert and to the exchange of child care services by Mildred and Allen with Susan and Peter
in examples discussed above.

IV. CONCLUSION.
Taxation is a practical enterprise for the purpose of raising revenue for the government to
pay for its costs. The system that is applied must be workable and, to the extent feasible, should
not conflict with other governmental and societal policies.
The thrust of the income tax system is to tax income earned from commercial activity.
There are good reasons not to tax income generated from noncommercial activities, and generally
taxes have not been applied in that situation even though no specific exception for
noncommercial income has ever been articulated. As a corollary to the proposed rule excluding
income from noncommercial activity, the combining of the labor of several persons to reach a
common noncommercial goal should be regarded as noncommercial and so should not be taxed
as an exchange of services.
There are several reasons to exempt noncommercial activities, which should be defined to
include the exchange of services that occurs when there is a pooling of labor for a common
noncommercial goal. In many cases, there would be significant difficulty in discovering the
events and in valuing them. Moreover, the transactions often would be of a personal nature, and
the identification of what occurred in order to tax it would entail an invasion of privacy and an
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intrusion into an individual’s private affairs. Just as the tax law does not tax the pooling of labor
in a partnership, it should not tax the pooling of labor in furtherance of a common
noncommercial goal.

.
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